Clearinghouse models of online pricing---such as Varian (1980) , Rosenthal (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) , and Baye-Morgan (2001)---view a price comparison site as an "information clearinghouse" where shoppers and loyals obtain price and product information to make online purchases. These models predict that the responsiveness of a firm's demand to a change in its price depends on the number of sellers and whether the price change results in the firm charging the lowest price in the market. Using a unique firm-level dataset from Kelkoo.com (Yahoo!'s European price comparison site), we examine these predictions by providing estimates of the demand for PDAs. Our results indicate that the number of competing sellers and both the firm's location on the screen and relative ranking in the list of prices are important determinants of an online retailer's demand. We find that an online monopolist faces an elasticity of demand of about -2, while sellers competing against 10 other sellers face an elasticity of about -6. We also find empirical evidence of a discontinuous jump in a firm's demand as its price declines from the second-lowest to the lowest price. Our estimates suggest that about 13% of the consumers at Kelkoo are "shoppers" who purchase from the seller offering the lowest price. house" where shoppers and loyals obtain price and product information to make online purchases. These models predict that the responsiveness of a …rm's demand to a change in its price depends on the number of sellers and whether the price change results in the …rm charging the lowest price in the market. Using a unique …rm-level dataset from Kelkoo.com (Yahoo!'s European price comparison site), we examine these predictions by providing estimates of the demand for PDAs. Our results indicate that the number of competing sellers and both the …rm's location on the screen and relative ranking in the list of prices are important determinants of an online retailer's demand. We …nd that an online monopolist faces an elasticity of demand of about 2, while sellers competing against 10 other sellers face an elasticity of about 6. We also …nd empirical evidence of a discontinuous jump in a …rm's demand as its price declines from the second-lowest to the lowest price. Our estimates suggest that about 13% of the consumers at Kelkoo are "shoppers"who purchase from the seller o¤ering the lowest price.
Introduction
A …rm's demand in the online marketplace-particularly at price comparison sites such as Shopper.com, Nextag, and Kelkoo.com-fundamentally di¤ers from demand at most physical marketplaces. One of the key di¤erences-…rst noted by Baye and Morgan (2001) but certainly anticipated by the early works of Varian (1980) , Rosenthal (1980) , Shilony (1977) , and Narasimhan (1988)-stems from the fact that consumers typically obtain a complete list of the prices charged by di¤erent sellers before making their purchase decision. As a consequence, a …rm enjoys a discontinuous jump in demand when it succeeds in charging the lowest price because it instantly attracts the price-sensitive "shopper" segment of the market. Moreover, unlike traditional retail markets where …rms like Wal Mart and Target compete and there is little turnover in the identity of the …rm charging the lowest price (it is almost always Wal Mart), the identify of the low-price seller frequently changes in online markets (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2004b; Ellison and Ellison, 2004) . Thus, it would seem to be important to account for the impact of shoppers when estimating online demand.
The online marketplace also di¤ers from its physical cousin in the volatility in the number of competing sellers. In conventional retail markets, the number of …rms competing for customers in (say) Walnut Creek, California change infrequently owing to the barriers to entry and exit associated with setting up a physical retail location. In the online world, change comes faster. This is particularly true in the marketplace de…ned by a price comparison site. Here, the number of …rms listing prices for a given product changes almost daily (see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004a) . Indeed, as pointed out by Baye and Morgan (2001) , this variation in the degree of rivalry of a given online market is essential for …rms to avoid pure Bertrand competition in these markets and for the information "gatekeeper"-the entity running the price comparison site-to pro…tably operate its site. Thus, it would seem to be important to account for the degree of rivalry-the number of competing sellers-in estimating demand online. Among other things, theory indicates that the number of competitors is a key determinant of …rm-level elasticities of demand: The greater the number of rivals, the more elastic is a …rm's demand.
A third way online markets di¤er from conventional markets is in the changing location 2 of …rms. In conventional retail markets, the physical real estate a retailer occupies changes infrequently, and identifying the component of the "value-added" by its physical location is di¢ cult to disentangle from other elements of the retailer's characteristics. In contrast, "virtual" real estate in the online world changes rapidly. For instance, in purchasing "adwords"(advertising space at the side of search queries on Google's site), retailers realize the advantage conferred to being the …rst listing on the page-and bid aggressively to obtain such a position. At any moment, a retailer can …nd itself displaced from this "prime" real estate to a less favorable screen location. Similar locational advantages presumably accrue to …rms with the topmost listings at price comparison sites, such as Kelkoo.com.
The rapidly changing nature of the online marketplace-the numbers of competing …rms, identity of the low-price …rm, and a …rm's screen locations-presents both a challenge and an opportunity in estimating demand in online markets. The challenge is that if one fails to properly account for discontinuities in a …rm's demand when it charges the lowest price, and the impact on a …rm's demand of its screen location and the number of rivals, one might obtain biased estimates of demand. The opportunities stem from the dynamic nature of the data. Variation in the identity of the low priced …rm enables one to disentangle the demand jump stemming from price sensitive shoppers from other determinants of demand. In conventional retail, such as in the competition between Target and Wal Mart, this identi…cation is most di¢ cult. A second opportunity arises from the frequently changing number of competitors, which enables identi…cation of the marginal impact of the number of rivals on a …rm's demand elasticity (and hence its markup). Obtaining these types of estimates from the physical marketplace is more di¢ cult. Finally, the variation in screen locations enables identi…cation of the value of the virtual real estate separately from …rm characteristics.
Before summarizing how we seek to overcome these challenges and take advantage of the opportunities described above, it is important to point out a …nal challenge typically faced by researchers seeking to estimate demand in online markets. Clearly, the ideal dataset for demand estimation would include actual quantity data; however, owing to the fragmented nature of the e-retail marketplace and the proprietary nature of data, this is often a formidable challenge. Indeed, we know of only one paper, Ellison and Ellison (2004) , that has been able to obtain quantity data, and even here the study is limited by the fact that the 3 data is only for one of the many sellers competing at a particular price comparison site. More often, all that is available is clicks (or leads) data at a price comparison site-data on the number of customers that clicked on a particular seller's price displayed at the price comparison site. Customers clicking through, in this fashion, are then redirected to the seller's site to purchase the product.
We address these challenges and opportunities. Our paper demonstrates that theoretical "clearinghouse" models of online competition can be used, in conjunction with identifying restrictions we set forth in Proposition 1, to estimate online demand using clicks data. In particular, we show that one can use existing pseudo-maximum likelihood as well as standard maximum likelihood techniques speci…cally designed for count data to obtain consistent estimates of underlying demand parameters (including demand elasticities). We then apply these techniques to unique clickthrough data for 18 personal digital assistants (PDAs) obtained from Yahoo!s European price comparison site, Kelkoo.com. Consistent with what one might conjecture based on the challenges we identi…ed above, we …nd evidence that it is indeed important to account for demand discontinuities, the number of rival sellers, and other determinants of demand such as screen location when estimating a …rm's demand in online markets.
More speci…cally, our econometric results reveal that it is important to account for the "jump" in a …rm's demand when it o¤ers the lowest price. We …nd that a …rm o¤ering the best price enjoys a 60 percent increase in demand compared to what it would have enjoyed had it not charged the lowest price. Perhaps more importantly, failing to account for the jump in demand leads to elasticity estimates that are about twice those obtained allowing for demand discontinuities. Our results also reveal that a …rm's elasticity of demand (apart from the jump discussed above) is more elastic in online markets where competition is keener. A monopoly seller faces an elasticity of demand of about 2.5, while in the most competitive markets we analyzed (15 sellers), the elasticity of demand for a representative …rm's product is about 6.0. We are also able to identify the e¤ect of other determinants of demand-such as screen location-on …rm demand. Our results imply that …rms lose about 15% of their business for every competitor listed above them on the screen.
Our results are related to a variety of papers in the literature. As noted earlier, Ellison 4 & Ellison (2004) use sales data for computer memory chips obtained from a single store, which listed on Pricewatch.com. The emphasis of their paper is on obfuscation and cross price elasticities between low and higher qualities of the same product o¤ered by the …rm; however they also indirectly obtain price elasticity estimates ranging from 25 to 40. In contrast, our analysis uses data from the complete set of …rms listing prices across a broader selection of products, and where obfuscation is not prevalent. Ghose, Smith and Telang (2004) impute the sales of used books from the website of Amazon.com, which lists price o¤ers for used books from many alternative and independent retailers. Using a multinomial logit model they estimate a price elasticity of 4.7, and note that the lowest priced o¤ers receive a discontinuously higher proportion of sales. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) rather ingeniously impute price elasticities for new books at two bookstores (Amazon and Barnes & Noble) using prices and relative sales rankings -obtained directly from the retailers'web sites rather than through a price comparison site (where price sensitivity may be expected to be greater). They estimate price elasticities of -0.6 for Amazon and -4 for Barnes and Noble, but these estimates do appear to be sensitive to the particular estimating technique adopted. Using a similar methodology, Ghose et al. (2004) estimate the price elasticity for new books at Amazon to be -1.2.
Our analysis complements these studies by o¤ering a methodology to directly estimate elasticities and to disentangle the impact on demand elasticities of: (1) discontinuous jumps at the lowest price; (2) variation in the number of competing …rms; and (3) variation in screen location of price quotes.
1 Our paper rationalizes the disparate elasticity estimates (which range from 0:6 to 40) obtained in various online markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next Section describes our data and provides an overview of the shopping environment at Kelkoo. In Section 3 we present the theory underlying our estimation methodology. Section 4 provides demand estimates based on individual as well as pooled products under the assumption that demand is continuous.
These latter estimates are nested as a special case of the discontinuous demand speci…cation, which is detailed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The data used in this paper was obtained from the price listing service, Kelkoo, which is owned by Yahoo! According to Yahoo!, Kelkoo is the largest price listing service in world, operating in eight European countries and is recognized as one of the six most accessed web-sites in Europe. Within the UK, Kelkoo is the third largest retail website and attracts over 10 million individual users per month-more than twice that of its closest rival. Kelkoo would seem to be representative of the overall UK e-retail marketplace. Over 1,800 individual retailers-including 18 of the 20 largest online retailers in the UK-list prices on Kelkoo. 2 Consumers interested in purchasing a broad range of products can access the Kelkoo site to obtain information about the product, a list of retailers selling the product, and the total prices charged for the product, including taxes and shipping charges. Consumers interested in making a purchase must 'click'on the …rm's link at the Kelkoo site. They are then sent to the retailer's site, where the …nal purchase is made. Figure 1 illustrates a typical screenshot for the HP iPAQ H5550 PDA. Notice that consumers are provided with a brief description of the product, a list of retailers selling the product, along with the total price including VAT and shipping charge ('P&P' in Kelkoo's terminology). Our analysis is based on the total price-the actual …nal amount a consumer purchasing the product would be charged, inclusive of taxes and shipping charges. We cleaned the data obtained from Kelkoo to ensure that our analysis is based on listings of products that are identical in every respect (including condition). 3 Kelkoo's revenue is generated by charging retailers a fee for each referral made; that is, each time a consumer clicks on the link at the Kelkoo site to a retailer's site. The fee charged by Kelkoo varies across products and retailers but is typically in the range of £ 0.20 to £ 1.00
per click, and is independent of whether a sale is subsequently made. Consumers are not charged for using Kelkoo's site.
Our data comes from referrals made through "menu prompted" results screens. A consumer arrives at these screens by navigating the products menu, moving from broader to 2 Data taken from Hitwise Statistics and company information provided by Kelkoo. 3 Arguably, one could simply add product controls for the small number of "variants" (e.g. refurbished, extra memory, etc.) of a given PDA in the sample. However, the number of these items was to permit this approach.
6 narrower product classes until arriving at the particular product in which she is interested. 4 For example, from Computers and Software in the opening page menu, a consumer would click and move to PDAs, where the menu has groupings by brand, price range, memory, weight and operating system. From this list, she would choose a speci…c PDA and be presented with a list of sellers and their prices. There are a number of reasons we opted for these data. First, Kelkoo generates roughly 45% of all its leads through consumers comparing prices in this fashion. Second, consumers using menu prompted searches are presented with price listings where the set and order of retailers displayed is unilaterally determined by Kelkoo and is identical for all consumers at any given time. Finally, the information displayed is veri…ed and updated daily. Unlike many other price comparison sites, the order of retailers listed on these pages is neither auctioned or sold directly to retailers and is independent of the price quoted and the speed with which the retailers respond to a price request. Consequently, as far as both consumers and retailers are concerned, the order of price quotations on any speci…c screen is exogenous.
It is clear from Figure 1 that there is considerable variation in both prices charged and the characteristics of retailers on the site. Retailers listing on Kelkoo include retailers with a large brick and mortar presence, such as Comet and PC World, well-known online retailers such as Amazon and Dell, as well as less known online retailers such as Big Grey Cat.
Kelkoo maintains a log of information on each 'referral' made. 5 The log registers the retailer name, product name, price information, time of referral, location of the retailer on the screen and a cookie speci…c reference. For this study, Kelkoo provided us with daily data extracted from their log for 18 speci…c PDAs for the period from 18 September 2003 to 6 January 2004, a period which generated over 40% of Kelkoo's annual tra¢ c. 6 This tra¢ c amounted to 39,568 leads generated via 20,509 separate "cookies." The majority (60.1%) of cookies generated only single leads, while a small number of cookies (0.56%) 4 One might worry about a potential selection issue using this data since the search technique adopted by the consumer is endogenous. For this reason, we examined the robustness of our results by using data based on referrals generated using alternative methods. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 5 Throughout the paper we use the terms 'referral,''lead,'and 'click'interchangeably. 6 Kelkoo is bound to protect the anonymity of retailers in disclosing information about the referrals they obtain. In providing the information from their log …les, the retailers were identi…ed in the dataset by codes, and by some key characteristics, such as whether they had a brick and mortar presence. generated a great many (>10) leads each. To avoid the potential problem of over-weighting consumers who generated multiple leads, we restrict our analysis only to the last clicks data for each cookie. 7 Over the period of the study there were 6,151 individual product, retailer and day speci…c price listings across the 18 PDAs monitored. For each of these daily listings,
we determined the number of (last-click) referrals per day, for each PDA sold by each seller.
Finally, we note that for all products in our sample, the complete list of price o¤ers was always displayed on a single page. Thus, no consumer was required to click more than once to view the entire list of …rms selling a speci…c PDA on a speci…c day.
Summary Statistics
Our analysis is based on the 18 models of PDAs listed in Firms with a brick and mortar presence obtained 29% of the total number of referrals. 7 We also performed the analysis reported below using data on all clicks as well as only …rst-clicks data and obtained qualitatively similar results.
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Weekdays generated the most tra¢ c, with an average of 350 referrals each day, while the weekends generated about three-quarters of this number (cf. Figure 2 ).
There are very substantial di¤erences in the number of referrals enjoyed by di¤erent retailers, ranging on a per-product basis from zero to 36 per day. The median number of referrals a …rm received on a given product was 2. In a substantial number of instances, a …rm received 0, 1, or 2 referrals for a given product on a given date. The average price was about £ 305 and the average shipping charge was about £ 4. The number of …rms listing prices on a given product-date varies considerably, ranging from 1 to 15 …rms with a standard deviation of 2.93. Figure 3 suggests that price and screen location play a potentially important role in determining the business enjoyed by particular online retailers. Consumers appear to be very sensitive to price, as is evidenced by the dramatic decline in leads enjoyed by …rms o¤ering less favorable prices. Likewise, consumers tend to frequent …rms that are listed above others on the screen. While screen location is not determined by price, it is possible that the results displayed in Figure 3 are the result of spurious correlation between screen location and price. We deal with this issue formally in Section 4 of the paper.
Estimation Methodology
In this section, we describe our methodology for estimating the impact of various explanatory variables on …rm demand at the Kelkoo site. Given that we only observe clicks and not …nal purchases, we o¤er identi…cation restrictions on demand that, if satis…ed, allow us to estimate …rm demand elasticities even though we do not have …nal sales data. In the second subsection, we describe the pseudo maximum likelihood procedures which permit us to obtain consistent estimates of various elasticities of demand.
Identi…cation Restrictions
Recall that, to purchase a product, a consumer visiting the Kelkoo site must …rst process the information contained on the site and decide whether, and on which …rm, to click. Following this, a consumer clicking through to the merchant's site obtains additional information about 9 the desirability of purchasing the product and ultimately decides whether to buy or not.
Thus, demand can be decomposed into two parts: the click generating process and the process of converting leads to sales. The process of generating leads depends on a number of factors, the most important of which are highlighted in Figure 4 . As the …gure shows, leads depend on the price a …rm charges, market structure-the number of other …rms o¤ering the same product and the prices these …rms are charging, the characteristics of the …rm, timing, and the location of the …rm's listing on the "page." Formally, let X denote this and other information a consumer obtains directly from the Kelkoo site. Note that X may include dummy variables to control for product-speci…c characteristics (some products are more popular and receive more clicks, on average, than others), …rm characteristics (some …rms may have a brick-and-mortar presence while others do not), and time e¤ects (…rms may receive fewer clicks on weekends or products may exhibit life-cycle e¤ects that cause clicks to vary systematically over time). Let the number of leads that …rm i receives, Q i , be drawn from some distribution F i ( jX) : Thus,
where we use a Lebesque integral to account for the fact that Q i is discrete. Based on the information in X-and this information alone-a representative consumer can decide to close his or her window or to click through to a particular merchant.
A consumer who clicks through to a …rms'site then receives additional information (denoted Z i ) that in ‡uences her decision to purchase. This information might include the …rm's attempt at obfuscation along the lines described by Ellison and Ellison (2004) , the visual attractiveness and usability of the …rm's site, whether the …rm is o¤ering any guarantees on the product over and above those provided by the manufacturer, the exact restocking and return policies of the …rm, and so on. Of course, a consumer's perceptions of these factors may be colored by the previous information, X; obtained on the Kelkoo site. Thus, the probability that a click is converted into a sale is
and, combining these expressions, the expected demand for a given product sold by …rm i is
Suppose that we are interested in the impact on the demand for a given product sold by …rm i from some explanatory variable, x i : It is useful to rewrite X = (x i ; X 1 ) where X 1 represents all components of X other than x i : The following proposition o¤ers conditions in which one may identify the impact of x i on …rm i's demand when only leads data are available.
Then one can use clicks data to identify the elasticities of demand with respect to x i (when demand is di¤erentiable with respect to x i ) as well as the percentage change in demand resulting from a given change in x i (when demand is not di¤erentiable with respect to x i ).
Proof. We …rst prove the result for the di¤erentiable case. Recall that log expected demand is given by
Di¤erentiating with respect to x i yields
Next, we prove the result for the non-di¤erentiable case.
where we have again used the fact that
Two special cases of Proposition 1 are worth noting. First, when x i is …rm i's price we can, in principle, estimate own price demand elasticities purely through leads data. Second, when x i is a discrete variable (such as a dummy variable), the proposition implies that we can use estimates based on clicks data to infer the percentage impact of a discrete change in
It is important to note, however, that even if the identifying restriction stated in Proposition 1 is not satis…ed, we are still in a position to examine the impact of various aspects of the leads generating process described in Figure 4 on the leads a …rm receives from Kelkoo. Even in this latter case, one may be able to use a priori information along with clickthrough elasticities to obtain bounds on demand elasticities. For instance, if one has reason to believe that conversion rates are increasing in x i , it follows that elasticities based on clickthrough data provide a lower bound on the relevant demand elasticity (since in this case,
).
In the sequel, we assume that the condition of Proposition 1 are satis…ed, so that we can identify relevant demand parameters purely through clicks data.
Data Generating Process for Leads
In light of the identi…cation restrictions in Proposition 1, the next step in estimating demand parameters is the speci…cation of the underlying stochastic process generating leads: For the reasons discussed below, we use a pseudo-maximum likelihood approach that does not require us to make speci…c assumptions about the underlying distribution generating Q i ; instead, we merely assume the underlying stochastic process has …nite mean, given by
In order to estimate the vector of unknown parameters, , one must account for the fact our clicks data consist of integer numbers of clicks. In fact, as shown in In short, by using pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates based on a Poisson distributional assumption, we obtain a consistent estimate of even if the underlying distribution is not Poisson. By using robust standard errors, we obtain consistent estimates of the variance of this estimate. In contrast, maximum likelihood methods based on a speci…c distributional assumption (such as the negative binomial) would lead to more e¢ cient estimates if the speci…cation of the data generating process is correct, but inconsistent estimates if the dis-13 tribution is not correct. Thus, as in Hall and Ziedonis (2001), our preference for the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood approach stems from its robustness to potential misspeci…ca-tion. As discussed below, we also provide MLE estimates in the Appendix based on speci…c distributional assumptions, including the negative binomial (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) , as well as speci…cations that allow for unobserved …rm heterogeneity (using both random and …rm speci…c e¤ects, as in Griliches, Hausman, and Hall, 1986) . It is reassuring that our results are robust to these alternative speci…cations.
Continuous Demand Models
In this section we provide estimates of a representative …rm's demand under the assumption that each …rm's demand is a continuous function of its price. As noted in the introduction, this is the conventional way of estimating demand, and has led to …rm elasticity estimates ranging from -0.6 (in the relatively concentrated online market for books) to about 40 (in a highly competitive online market for computer memory). The main message of this section is to show that di¤erences in seller concentration across di¤erent PDAs is useful in explaining variations in …rm elasticities.
Estimates by Product
As a starting point, we pool across …rms (i) and dates (t) ; but estimate separate elasticities for each of the 18 di¤erent models of PDAs in our data using the pseudo-maximum likelihood procedure described above. Speci…cally, we assume
where Q ijt is the number clicks …rm i received on product j at time t, p ijt is the total price (including VAT and shipping) …rm i charged for product j at time t, and X 1;ijt is a vector of controls. Notice that, under our maintained hypothesis that the identifying restrictions in Proposition 1 hold, j is the own price elasticity of demand for a representative seller of a model j PDA. Table 3 reports the results, which include the following controls:
of the screen, it tends to receive more clicks. Clicks decrease monotonically as the position on the screen gets lower. Hence, we have included a linear screen location control to absorb this e¤ect.
Weekend. As displayed in Figure 2 , there are systematically fewer clicks on weekends than on weekdays. Hence, we have included a weekend dummy variable to control for this e¤ect on demand.
Month. Our dataset covers, in part, the fourth quarter of the year, which traditionally the strongest part of the retail season. As a result, we include month dummies to control for seasonal e¤ects on demand.
Notice that 13 of the estimated own price elasticities in Table 3 are statistically significantly di¤erent from zero at the 1 percent level, with values ranging from 1.75 (for the Toshiba E770) to 14.691 (for the HP Compaq iPAQ 1940). These estimates vary widely across PDAs. In interpreting these results, and to better understand the widely di¤erent estimates obtained for di¤erent models of PDAs, it is important to recognize that these estimates are …rm elasticities -not market elasticities. One of the key determinants of the elasticity of demand is the availability of substitutes -the more sellers o¤ering the same product, the more elastic is the demand facing a …rm selling that product. It is well-known, for instance, in a symmetric n-…rm capacity-constrained price-setting environment, the elasticity of demand facing an individual …rm (E F ) is n times the market elasticity (E M ): E F = nE M . If this is the case and di¤erent numbers of …rms sold di¤erent types of PDAs, the …rm elasticities of demand would vary widely across PDA models even if the market elasticity of demand were the same for each model of PDA.
Thus, it seems useful to investigate the relationship between our elasticity estimates and the average number of …rms listing a price, across PDA models. This relationship is plotted in Figure 5 . The estimates are divided into those that do not obtain statistical signi…cance at conventional levels, which are shown as open circles and those that attain signi…cance at the 1% level, which are shown as …lled-in diamonds. As the …gure shows, there is a strong negative relationship between the elasticity estimates for each of the products and the average number of …rms o¤ering price quotes for the product. This suggests the need for 15 controlling for "market structure"among PDAs, were one to pool across all products. Thus, even if the market elasticity of demand were identical for each of the 18 models of PDAs, …rms selling di¤erent PDAs would face di¤ering elasticities of demand given the inverse relationship between the elasticities of demand the number of …rms selling each product.
Pooled Estimates
We now report estimates obtained by pooling across …rms (i) and dates (t) ; and di¤erent models of PDAs using the pseudo-maximum likelihood procedure described earlier.
Here we consider two models: a baseline model that does not allow elasticities to vary with the number of sellers, and a more general model that takes into account our preliminary …ndings in the individual product speci…cations. The baseline model assumes
The controls for this speci…cation include all of those in equation (3) as well as following:
PDA Model. As the previous speci…cation revealed, there are di¤erences in clicks for each of the di¤erent PDA models. For instance, PDAs di¤er from one another in terms of their popularity, their operating system, various performance characteristics, add-on software, and so on. Thus we include dummy variables for each of the 18 PDA models.
PDA Model-Month Interactions. In addition, the popularity of a PDA varies depending on new entrants in the PDA product space. As technology and performance improve with the introduction of new models, the popularity of an existing PDA can decline-sometimes dramatically. To control for these e¤ects, we include dummies interacting each of the 18
PDAs with the month dummies mentioned above. This, in principle, allows for di¤ering PDA "life cycle"e¤ects.
Bricks and Clicks Retailer. Some of the …rms in our dataset have an established physical presence in addition to their online presence. These are commonly referred to as "bricks and clicks"retailers. Clearly, the reputation as well as the ease of returns and accumulated brand equity of these retailers are likely to be di¤erent from those with only an online presence.
Thus, we include a dummy variable for whether a particular …rm is a bricks and clicks retailer or not.
With these controls in place, we report pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates (based on a Poisson likelihood function) using equation (4) in the column labeled "Model 1" in Table   4 . The bottom of Table 4 also reports the results of a Lagrange multiplier test for over dispersion of the negative binomial (2) type (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1990) . This is a test of the null hypothesis that the mean and variance of the click generating process are equal, as would be the case were the data generating process truly coming from a Poisson distribution. As the table shows, we overwhelmingly reject this hypothesis, indicating that the underlying distribution is not Poisson. As discussed above, the parameter estimates are nonetheless consistent (provided the mean speci…cation in equation (4) Huber (1967) and White (1980 White ( ,1982 . 8 The corresponding z-statistics are reported in Table 4 . The results show a price elasticity of -4.61, which is fairly close to the average over the individual product elasticities reported in Table 3 . More favorable screen positions are also shown to lead to increased clicks. Using the maintained hypothesis that conversion rates are independent of screen position at the comparison site, one can interpret the e¤ect on demand of screen position as follows: All else equal, a …rm which is shifted by one rank in its screen location experiences an 18.6% decrease in demand. These results con…rm what we saw earlier in Figure 3 : There is a strong tendency for consumers to click on …rms in higher positions, all else equal. This is consistent with the observation that, for search engines such as Google, Overture, and Nextag, who auction screen position, there is a signi…cant premium associated with being located in the highest position.
Interestingly, while the coe¢ cient associated with being a bricks and clicks retailer has the expected positive sign (0.262), it is not signi…cant at conventional levels. One potential reason for this is that, in light of the relationship we observed in Figure 5 , the baseline model 8 Speci…cally, we use the grouping technique of Rogers (1993) to relax the independence of observations for a given …rm i across products and time. This allows potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the errors. 9 Some researchers have taken the view that the rejection of the null hypothesis of no overdispersion warrants the use of a negative binomial speci…cation. For this reason, we report ML estimates based on the negative binomial (2) speci…cation in Table A1 . As that table shows, the parameter estimates are very similar.
is potentially misspeci…ed because it assumes a representative …rm's elasticity of demand is independent of the number of …rms. As we shall see in Section 5, when we account for this, together with the potential discontinuity in demand for the …rm o¤ering the lowest price, the coe¢ cient on bricks and clicks retailers remains positive and becomes signi…cant.
To account for a potential relationship between a …rm's elasticity of demand and the number of competing seller in the pooled model, we modify equation (4) to allow individual …rm elasticities to depend on the number of listing …rms as follows:
where n jt denotes the number of …rms listing prices. Notice that, in this speci…cation, the elasticity of demand facing a representative …rm is given by 0 + (n jt 1) 1 :
Thus, 0 represents the elasticity of demand facing a monopoly seller, 0 + 1 represents the elasticity of demand in duopoly PDA markets, and more generally, 1 represents the impact on a …rm's elasticity of demand of facing an additional competitor. In addition to our earlier controls, we include the following:
The Number of Sellers. Besides the theoretical rationale for permitting a representative …rm's elasticity of demand to depend on the number of sellers, one might expect the number of clicks received by a particular …rm to directly depend on the number of sellers. For a given consumer base, adding additional sellers would tend to reduce the expected number of clicks enjoyed by any particular …rm. In addition, one might speculate that consumers are more likely to click and purchase PDAs that are sold by more …rms, as additional …rms might stimulate online sales by making the market appear more credible in the eyes of consumers.
As we will see below, our framework permits one to disentangle these two competing e¤ects.
The resulting estimates are displayed in the Model 2 column of Table 4 . As the table shows, the number of sellers has a signi…cant e¤ect on clicks-both in terms of levels as well as on price elasticities. Controlling for the number of …rms listing prices, we …nd that the price elasticity of a monopoly seller is 3.761, which implies a gross margin of 26.6%.
Adding a second …rm to the market raises the price elasticity to around 4.049 and cuts the gross margin to 24.7%. When ten …rms list prices, the estimated elasticity becomes 6.641 or about 15.1% gross margins. These results suggest that the UK online market for PDAs is extremely competitive. By way of comparison, the average gross margin for US electronic shopping and mail order retailers (NAICS 4541) was 38.5%. 10 The sign of the coe¢ cient capturing the impact of the number of …rms listing prices on elasticity is also consistent with the simple capacity constrained price setting model described above.
What is the impact of a change in the number of competing …rms on the overall numbers of clicks for a speci…c PDA? As we mentioned above, there is a direct e¤ect as well as an indirect e¤ect from increased competitiveness. Taking the derivative of equation (5) and evaluating it at the mean of our data yields Table 4 shows, moving down one screen position decreases the number of clicks by 17.5%. Thus, our estimates suggest that the impact on clicks of screen position is more than four times larger than the impact on clicks of an additional competitor appearing on the price comparison site.
While the above results are of some interest, there is reason to believe that the underlying continuous demand model on which the estimated demand elasticities as well as the marginal e¤ects of screen location and the number of listings is misspeci…ed. As we have emphasized, the pseudo-maximum likelihood approach is robust against distributional assumptions but not misspeci…cation of the underlying mean of the stochastic process. We conclude this section with a discussion of several potential problems that we address below.
Potential Misspeci…cation
One may have a number of concerns regarding the estimates based on the continuous demand speci…cation in equation ( To see the potential rami…cations of this on demand estimation, suppose there is a unit mass of consumers, half of which are "shoppers" who purchase at the lowest price and the other half are "loyals" who have a preference for a particular seller. Suppose consumers within each group have identical demand functions given by D = p . A …rm that charges the lowest price in the market enjoys demand from both groups, while a …rm charging a price above the minimum price in the market sells only to its loyal customers. Figure 6 illustrates the rami…cations on demand estimation. The slope of the two steep lines through the data are the same, and represent the true elasticity of demand, , for prices above or below the minimum price. At the minimum price, there is a discontinuous jump in demand owing to the fact that the …rm attracts all of the shoppers at this price.
The dashed line through the data represents the elasticity estimate that results from failing to take into account the discontinuous jump in demand that occurs when the …rm charges the lowest price. Notice that, by ignoring the jump in demand at the lowest price, one obtains an estimate of the true elasticity that overstates how responsive consumers are to a change in price.
In addition to the potential problem caused by using a continuous demand speci…cation in the presence of "shoppers," two additional econometric issues are potentially relevant.
First, while there are sound theoretical reasons for elasticities (and per-…rm demand) to depend on the number of …rms listing prices, the estimates may be biased due to potential endogeneity. In particular, popular products are likely to (for a given number of …rms) result in a …rm receiving more clicks, and this may encourage additional …rms to enter the market.
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We attempted to control for this by including product dummies and interactions between product and month dummies. However, endogeneity of the sort described above could, in principle, still be a problem.
Second, while we have controlled for what seemed an important …rm characteristicwhether a …rm is a bricks and clicks retailer-a variety of unobserved …rm characteristics, such as the degree of accumulated brand equity or di¤erences in consumers'perceptions of …rm quality, could also potentially bias our results. Thus, it may be important to try to control for unobserved …rm characteristics in estimating demand.
We address these and other issues in the next section.
Discontinuous Demand and Unobserved Heterogeneity
We now turn to estimating demand in the presence of a mix of price-sensitive shoppers and "loyals". We …rst sketch the theory underlying the demand estimation. We then describe the estimating equation and report results. Finally, we examine issues associated with endogeneity and unobserved …rm characteristics.
Theory and Estimation Strategy
Suppose that n jt …rms numbered i = 1; 2; :::; n jt sell product j at a price comparison site on date t. Let p ijt denote the price of …rm i in the market for product j. A …rm in this market sells to two types of consumers: Shoppers, who always purchase from the …rm charging the lowest price, and loyals, who purchase from their preferred …rm. Because of the extreme price sensitivity of shoppers, it is useful to de…ne the set of …rms o¤ering the "best"(lowest) price for product j at time t . De…ne the set
which is the set of …rms o¤ering the "best"price on this product date.
Let Q S ijt and Q L ijt denote the product j leads …rm i obtains from shoppers and loyals, respectively, when charging the price p ijt : Recall that …rm i obtains product j leads from 21 shoppers only if it is in the set B jt ; that is, if it o¤ers one of the best prices. Thus, the clicks …rm i obtains when it charges a price p ijt ; given the prices charged by other …rms is
Thus, …rm i faces a "jump in demand" for product j when it is among those …rms o¤ering the "best"price for product j.
We utilize the following functional approach that facilitates structural estimation of demand in a clearinghouse model. To account for the discontinuity in demand when the …rm o¤ers one of the best prices in the market, let I jt be an indicator function that equals unity when i 2 B jt and zero otherwise, and let #B jt denote the cardinality of B jt ; that is, the number of …rms o¤ering the best price for product j. Suppose that …rm i 's elasticity of demand when it sells product j is jt ; so that we may write
where L ijt (X) and S ijt (X) represent the non-price determinants of leads (such as screen location) on loyals and shoppers, respectively. To ease the notational burden, we suppress the X argument where it is clear.
Taking logs (and noting that ln[1 + ijt
In addition to the identifying restriction in Proposition 1, estimation requires imposing additional structure on the parameters in equation (6) . We assume a …rm's elasticity of demand for product j in period t is given by
As in the previous section, this parsimonious speci…cation takes into account the theoretical relation between a …rm's elasticity and the number of competing …rms. In addition, we allow di¤erent …rms to have di¤erent numbers of loyals and shoppers, and also permit the number of each to vary over time and across products. However, we assume
so that the ratio of these two expressions is constant. In particular, this assumption implies
which yields
where X 1;jt is the matrix of controls discussed earlier (position on screen, bricks and clicks retailer, weekend, product dummies, month dummies, and product-month interaction dummies). We continue to take as our maintained hypothesis that the identifying restrictions in Proposition 1 hold so that ( 0 + (n jt 1) 1 ) represents the elasticity of demand of a …rm that faces n jt 1 competitors. If, in addition, conversion rates are independent of t, I jt , and the cardinality of the number of …rms o¤ering the lowest price #B jt ; one may interpret as the size of the jump in demand that a …rm enjoys when it o¤ers the "best"price. Notice that the continuous demand model is nested in the speci…cation of equation (8) when = 0:
Thus, the null hypothesis that the continuous "restriction" on the discontinuous demand model is true lends itself readily to testing.
Discontinuous Demand Estimates
Model 1 in Table 5 reports Pseudo-maximum Likelihood (PML) estimates of the parameters in equation (8) . Recall that under the nested model of continuous demand, the coe¢ cient 23 associated with the demand shift from shoppers is predicted to equal zero. The alternative hypothesis, predicted from the clearinghouse literature, is that this coe¢ cient should be positive. The coe¢ cient estimate for this e¤ect is 0.603. Moreover, we can reject the null hypothesis of the continuous demand model in favor of the (one-sided) alternative of discontinuous demand at the 1% signi…cance level. In short, we …nd considerable evidence for a demand shift when a …rm o¤ers the minimum price. Figure 6 suggested that, were such a demand shift present, we should estimate demand as being more elastic under the continuous demand model than when one accounts for the potential demand discontinuity. Accounting for the discontinuity in demand, the estimated elasticity goes from 3:761 (in Model 2 of Table 4 ) to 2.459 (in Model 1 of Table 5 ).
Translating this into gross margins, accounting for discontinuous demand changes raises the estimated gross margin of a monopoly online seller from around 27% to around 40%.
This estimate seems quite reasonable in view of the 38.5% gross margin reported in the Census data described above. Turning to the e¤ect on elasticity of increasing numbers of …rms one again sees the same directional bias in the estimates of the continuous demand model compared to the discontinuous demand model. Speci…cally, the incremental e¤ect of an additional …rm on elasticity is reduced by around 12.5 percent (from 0:288 to 0:252) when the demand shift from "shoppers" is accounted for. Taken together, the coe¢ cient estimates on log total price and log total price number of listings are consistent with the e¤ect on demand illustrated in Figure 6 : The continuous demand model tends to yield more elastic demand estimates than the discontinuous demand model when a demand shift is present. We also note that, in contrast to the continuous demand speci…cation, the e¤ect of a change in the number of …rms on a …rm's overall demand
It is of some interest to note the economic relevance of our estimate of (0:603). Other things equal, a …rm that sets lowest price in the market enjoys a 60.3 percent increase in demand, compared to the case where its price is not the lowest price. At the individual …rm level, may be interpreted as the ratio of the number of shoppers to the number of consumers loyal to a particular …rm. Thus, for every 100 consumers loyal to a particular …rm, the representative …rm gains an additional 60 shoppers when it sets the lowest price.
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In contrast, notice that the position on screen coe¢ cient is only 0.175. This implies that a …rm would have to move up in its screen position more than 3 positions to generate the same demand increase that results by setting the lowest price in the market. Finally it is worth noting that, accounting for discontinuous demand, the e¤ect of being a bricks and clicks retailer is statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. The demand for a bricks and clicks retailer is about 32.1 percent higher than that of a …rm that only has an online presence.
One may use the estimate of to obtain a crude gauge of the fraction of consumers using the Kelkoo site who are shoppers. Note that the total number of clicks for product j on a given date is
while the corresponding number of clicks stemming from shoppers is
Hence, shoppers as a fraction of all consumers is given by
Imposing symmetry across …rms (so that all of the above terms are independent of i), one obtains
which implies (given the estimate of = :603 reported in Model 1 of Table 5 and the mean number of listings (4:05) in our data) that about 13 percent of consumers at Kelkoo are Shoppers. While the symmetry assumptions used to obtain this crude estimate are at odds with the data (among other things, the estimates suggest that bricks-and-clicks sellers receive 32.1 percent more clicks than pure online sellers), it nonetheless illustrates that even in online markets where only 13 percent of the consumers are "shoppers,"the discontinuity arising from these consumers can signi…cantly impact elasticity estimates. Indeed, a …rm that reduces its price just a penny below that of its rivals enjoys a 60 percent increase in demand and an extremely "elastic"overall response.
The results reported for Model 1 in Table 5 , like those presented earlier for the continuous demand speci…cations, su¤er from a number of potential problems. We conclude by addressing some of these concerns.
Unobserved Firm Heterogeneity. One potential shortcoming of the PML approach used in Model 1 of Table 5 is that the speci…cation presumes there is no unobserved heterogeneity across …rms. While we have attempted to control for di¤erences across …rms that stem from their having di¤erent online and o-ine presences, as well as di¤erent screen locations, it is still possible that a particular …rm's demand is also driven by unobserved factors. For this reason, we also report in Table 5 results that allow for the e¤ects of unobserved …rm heterogeneity.
Model 2 in Table 5 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the discontinuous demand model based on the random e¤ects speci…cation for unobserved …rm heterogeneity pioneered by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) , while Model 3 reports conditional maximum likelihood estimates based on a …xed e¤ects speci…cation for unobserved …rm heterogeneity. Note that these results require the speci…cation of the actual likelihood function, which we have take to be Poisson. However, Table A2 in the appendix shows that the results reported in Table 5 and discussed below are similar if one uses the likelihood function for a negative binomial (2) speci…cation.
Notice that, in both the random e¤ects (Model 2) and …xed e¤ects (Model 3) speci…ca-tions, the coe¢ cients of interest are roughly comparable to those obtained ignoring potential unobserved heterogeneity (Model 1). The continuous demand model is once again nested 26 (and rejected) in these speci…cations. Further, the economic value of the coe¢ cient associated with the demand shift is largely unchanged by allowing for potential unobserved heterogeneity. Likewise, the coe¢ cient associated with the elasticity of demand for a monopoly …rm remains at about 2:5; similar to the estimate obtained in Model 1.
In contrast, the coe¢ cient associated with the marginal e¤ect on price elasticity of changing the number of rivals is reduced in Models 2 and 3 compared to Model 1. One possibility is that some …rms tend to sell in markets where there are a large number of rivals while other …rms tend to sell products where there are only a small number of rivals. Allowing for unobserved …rm heterogeneity soaks up this variation which was previously ignored in Model 1. Nonetheless, the results continue to suggest that it is important to account for the degree of rivalry in online markets: …rms that face more rivals continue to face more elastic demand.
Endogeneity. Another potential concern, which we alluded to earlier, is that the number of …rms listing prices may be endogenous -…rms may be more eager to list prices for products where consumer demand is high, and thus the number of …rm e¤ects documented earlier might stem from spurious correlation. To examine this possibility, we used the test procedure suggested by Wooldridge (1997) ; cf. Terza, (1998). The idea is to obtain instruments that are correlated with the number of listings in our data but uncorrelated with the number of clicks enjoyed by a particular …rm. One then uses standard techniques to regress the number of listings on the instruments and the remaining control variables, compute the resulting residuals from this regression, and then include these residuals as an additional explanatory variable in the maximum likelihood estimation of the underlying count model.
The test is a simple LM test, which is conducted after estimating the model under the null assumption that the coe¢ cients on these residual terms is zero.
As is the case with any endogeneity test, the power of this test depends on the availability of good instruments. For this reason, we collected additional data from the U.S. which we believe is likely to satisfy these conditions. In particular, for each of the PDAs in our UK sample and for each date, we obtained data on that PDAs product popularity rating from
Shopper.com, a US price comparison site. 11 This product popularity ranking is based on 11 The interested reader should consult Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004a) for additional details con-27 the lagged number of U.S. clickthroughs on the U.S. price comparison site. It seems likely that the product popularity of an identical model PDA in the US is correlated with its popularity in the UK. However, it is not likely to be correlated with the actual number of clicks that particular U.K. sellers listing at the Kelkoo site received on any given date.
Among other things, it would be unusual for a US consumer using Shopper.com to cross the "virtual" border and shop at UK price comparison sites such as Kelkoo. Indeed, as Table   1 showed, there would be little incentive for a US consumer to do so during the period of our study. Since the e¤ect of number of …rms listing prices enters both directly as well as through an interaction term with ln (p ijt ) in the speci…cation given in equation (8) ; we used US product rank and product rank squared as instruments. Residuals were obtained based on simultaneous estimation to obtain residuals for both number of …rms and the interaction term. Table 5 reports the results of the endogeneity tests for Models 1 through Model 3. In all cases, there appears to be little evidence against the null hypothesis that the number of …rms is not endogenous. In short, it does not appear that the estimated e¤ect of the number of rival …rms on an online seller's elasticity of demand is driven by an endogeneity problem or unobserved heterogeneity.
Conclusions
We have developed identi…cation restrictions which enable us to estimate demand elasticities in online markets using only clicks data. We then showed that one can use pseudo-maximum likelihood methods on these count data to obtain consistent estimates of an online seller's demand. Applying there methods to a unique data set for 18 models of PDAs sold at Yahoo!'s European price comparison service, Kelkoo, we report estimates of the elasticity of demand facing online retailers in the UK, as well as estimates of several other key determinants of online demand.
In addition to providing a theoretical basis for demand estimation using clicks data, there are three main messages that emerge from our analysis. First, in estimating an online cerning data from this site.
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retailer's elasticity of demand, it appears to be important to control for variation in the number of rival …rms in the relevant online market. Our results suggest that a monopoly seller faces an elasticity of demand of about 2.5, while a …rm's demand becomes increasing elastic as the number of rival sellers increases. In the most competitive markets we analyzed (15 sellers), the elasticity of demand for a representative …rm's product is about 6.0. This …nding may partially explain the wide array of elasticity estimates obtained in online markets for books and computer memory. One potential explanation for these diverse estimates is di¤erences in the number of …rms-i.e., the rivalry of the industry: the online market for books is considerably more concentrated than the online retail market for computer memory.
Second, our results provide some support for clearinghouse models that have been widely used to model online competition. These models predict a "jump"in a …rm's demand when it o¤ers the lowest price. Indeed, our results indicate that such a jump is present in the data and that the economic impact of the jump is signi…cant. In the UK online market for PDAs, a …rm o¤ering the lowest price enjoys a 60 percent increase in demand compared to what it would have enjoyed had it not charged the lowest price. Moreover, we show that failing to account for the jump in demand leads to biased elasticity estimates: Elasticity estimates in the continuous demand speci…cation are almost twice those obtained allowing for demand discontinuities. Interestingly, we showed that estimates of the size of the "jump" may be used to obtain a crude estimate of the fraction of price sensitive "shoppers" in the market.
For the case of the PDA market at Kelkoo, approximately 13 percent of online consumers are shoppers who purchase at the lowest price, while it appears that 87 percent of the consumers are loyal to particular sellers. Our results thus suggest that even a relatively small number of "shoppers"can result in sizable jumps in …rm-level demand and a signi…cant bias (if ignored) in elasticity estimates.
Finally, we have identi…ed several other potentially important determinants of online demand. It appears that online consumers in the UK favor …rms that have both an online as well as a brick and mortar presence: These …rms enjoy about 30 percent more sales than their pure online competitors. Our results also suggest that UK consumers are clicking more often at work than at home: online sales are about 27 percent lower on weekends than during the week. We speculate that this is an artifact of the low (relative to the US) broadband penetration at residences, and probably overstates the weekend e¤ect present in US data and probably in the UK data going forward. Finally, as is the case in the physical marketplace, location matters in the online world. We …nd that …rms listed at the top of the screen of price quotes systematically receive more clicks than …rms listed further down the screen.
Indeed, we estimate that being shifted down one position on the screen costs a …rm about 15% of its clicks, even after controlling for price and other characteristics.
All of the results discussed above are robust to alternative assumptions regarding the speci…cation of likelihood functions, controls for potential unobserved …rm heterogeneity, as well as endogeneity. Nonetheless, we stress that our interpretation of these results as representing demand rather than clicks estimation critically depends on the assumption that the identi…cation restriction in Proposition 1 holds. Roughly, this requires that the rate at which clicks are converted into …nal sales are, on average, independent of the underlying price and other determinants observable at the Kelkoo site generating a click in the …rst place.
While we believe these identi…cation assumptions are reasonable, we conclude by noting 
